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Abstract—Increasing penetration of renewable energy re-
sources (RES) and electrification of services by implementing
distributed energy resources (DER) has caused a paradigm shift
in the operation of the power system. The controllability of the
power system is predicted to be shifted from the generation
side to the consumption side. This transition entails that the
future power system evolves into a complex cyber-physical energy
system (CPES) with strong interactions between the power,
communication and neighboring energy systems. Current power
system security assessment methods are based on centralized
computation and N-1 contingencies, while these risks should
still be considered in the future CPES, additional factors are
affecting the system security. This paper serves as a review
of the challenges entailed by transforming the power system
into a CPES from a security assessment perspective. It gives
an indication of theoretical solutions to CPES challenges and
proposes a new framework for security assessment in CPES.
Index Terms—Communication system, cyber-physical systems,
distributed power generation, power system security, security
assessment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent increase in implementation of generation based
on renewable energy sources (RES) such as wind and solar,
together with an increased focus on mitigating emission of
greenhouse gasses in services such as transportation, through
electric vehicles (EVs), and domestic heating through heat
pumps (HPs), have led to a complex layout of the future power
system [1]. Integrating these technologies into the power
system changes its topology from being centralized with a
few large controllable synchronous generators to being de-
centralized with numerous distributed generating (DGs) units
based on intermittent energy sources [2]. In order to manage
the decentralization of the power system, smarter monitoring
and control techniques are required. This issue is addressed
by implementing an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
through smart meters and phasor measurement units (PMUs),
as well as a further utilization of information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT).
ICT helps improve the visibility of current power system
operation and enhances the possibilities of advanced control
processes [1]. The ICT network build around the power system
becomes more and more integrated and the whole system
is transitioning into a complex cyber-physical energy system
(CPES) [3]. The strong interactions across systems in a CPES
entails new challenges in maintaining a high security of supply,
as new factors can affect the general security of the power
system. Such factors include cybersecurity, behavior and con-
straints of neighboring energy systems, and the dynamics
of interactions between the different systems [4]. In order
to acknowledge security threats from ICT and neighboring
energy systems, a revisit of current power system operation
methods is necessary.
Power system security assessment plays a central role in
maintaining a high security of supply. However, it is based on
a centralized power system and does not consider the threats
entailed by the transition towards a CPES. The aim of this pa-
per is to review the power system security assessment method
from a CPES perspective. This review includes a description
of the current security assessment method, a presentation of
operational factors of CPES to be considered, a discussion of
challenges of the current security assessment method entailed
by CPES, and propose a new framework for future CPES
security assessment.
Section II introduces the current power system security
assessment method and the three key factors, safety, security
and sustainability, of cyber-physical system (CPS) operation.
Section III discusses CPES challenges of the current security
assessment method, section IV presents a new framework
for CPES security assessment based on the discussion in
section III and emerging methods and philosophies. Section
V concludes.
II. CPES TRANSITION
Kundur et al. [5] have defined power system security as the
degree of risk in its ability to survive imminent disturbances
without interruption of customer service. In order to ensure a
high level of supply security, power system operators need to
verify operational properties in its continuous operation and
in the event of a disturbance that can change the operational
environment. If a disturbance is expected to interrupt or limit
the supply, the power system operators are required to change
the operation of the power system in order to secure the system
from such a disturbance [6].
A. Power System Security Assessment
The starting point of the continuous process of security
assessment is the monitoring phase as shown in Fig. 1. De-
pending on the measuring devices, a supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) network, PMUs or a combination
of both, measurements are taken and send to the control
center every few second or millisecond. The measurements
include physical properties such as system frequency, bus
voltages, equipment thermal loading and generator rotor angle
displacement as well as load and generation levels [6]. After
measurements are received by the control center, operational
constraints are verified. This process takes place in the alarm-
phase shown in Fig. 1, where a few constraint examples are
listed [6].
Every few minutes, the measured data are used by the power
system operators to perform the contingency analysis shown in
Fig. 1. The contingency analysis is based on the N-1 criterion
and involves simulating a model of the power system, where
one component is taken out of operation, through a load flow
calculation to see how the power system reacts to such a
disturbance. Ideally, power system operators should simulate
all possible contingencies in order to ensure power system
security. However, the computational burden of simulating the
power system model is too extensive. Therefore, power system
operators identify and simulate the most critical contingencies
and assume the remaining possible contingencies have limited
effect on the power system [7].
As shown in Fig 1, the results from the contingency analysis
are used to check power system operation in case of a
disturbance. This check is performed in the alarm-phase of
Fig. 1, where operational values are compared to power system
constraints. If either current operation or a disturbance can
cause operational constraints to be violated, power system
operators need to perform preventive control [6]. Power system
operators can perform different actions in order to satisfy
operational constraints, some of them are listed in Fig. 1.
The current security assessment displayed in Fig. 1 is highly
dependent on valid measurements and accurate computations
in comparing operational limits and calculating load flow. In



















Fig. 1. Flowchart of current power system security assessment method.
the operation of the ICT network and depends on the reliable
operation of the CPES as a whole.
B. CPS Safety, Security and Sustainability
In recent years the classification of CPS has emerged in
different technologies such as health care, smart energy and
industrial control systems [8], [9]. In CPS, there is a general
understanding of three key factors that has to be preserved
in order for CPS to function as intended. These factors
are referred to as S3, and consist of safety, security and
sustainability. The complexity of the power system transition
towards a CPES is illustrated in Fig. 2. First of all, CPS safety
is characterized as avoidance of hazards that can interrupt the
CPS operation [3]. These hazards are the result of different
interactions within the CPS symbolized by the blue dobble
arrows in Fig. 2.
In CPS there are intended and unintended interactions
between the different systems, where intended interactions
are created to improve the CPS operation and unintended
interactions are caused by changes in the different system
environment that can have a harmful effect on the system
operation [3]. Furthermore, researchers distinguish between
three different types of interactions, inter-physical, cyber-
physical and inter-cyber interactions. Each of these types
can have both intended and unintended interactions [3]. As
the power system transits towards a CPES with numerous
interactions, the reliability of electricity supply depends on
CPS safety in avoiding all serious hazards.
CPS security is characterized as assurance of integrity,
authenticity, and confidentiality of information, which can be
understood as ensuring the cybersecurity of the ICT system in
the CPES from unauthorized access [3]. As the future power
system will rely on a complicated ICT system to monitor and
control the operation of future CPES, the security and validity
of the data transmitted in the communication network and
processed in the information network becomes an important
factor to consider [10]. In Fig. 2, the security of the CPES is
represented by a cyber-perimeter which objective is to block








- Risk consideration (unintended interactions)
- Preventive controls (intended interactions)
Fig. 2. Power system transition towards a cyber-physical energy system.
The last of the entities in S3, required for ensuring intended
operation of CPS, is sustainability which is characterized as
maintenance of long-term operation of CPS using environ-
mental friendly sources of energy [3]. From a power system
perspective, the motivation for transitioning the power system
into a CPES is to enable an efficient integration of RES into
the generation part and environmental friendly alternatives
to services into the consumption part of the power system.
Therefore, you could say that sustainability is an inherent part
of the future power system through the decentralization of
generating units, which is illustrated by the arrow in Fig. 2. In
order to ensure CPES sustainability, the power system needs
intelligent control and monitoring processes from the ICT
system because of the intermittent nature of distributed energy
resources (DERs).
III. SECURITY ASSESSMENT CHALLENGES
The main challenge of the current security assessment
method is the decentralization of generating units and interac-
tions between the power system and an ICT network, which
changes the landscape of the modern power system. This
change affects the requirements of power system operational
methods that help operators maintain a high security of supply
illustrated by the transition in Fig. 2. From the characterization
of a CPES based on S3, it is apparent that each phase of
the current security assessment method in Fig. 1 becomes
insufficient, as a method of securing the electricity supply in
the future.
A. Monitoring
In section II the monitoring phase of security assessment
is described as providing the power system operators with the
visibility of the current operational status. In this way ensuring
the validity of the acquired data is extremely important in
operating power systems. With the transition towards a CPES,
monitoring the current power system operation becomes in-
creasingly challenging. In recent years, researchers have in-
vestigated the possibility of ICT cyberattacks with false data
injection into a CPES, that can result in an inaccurate picture
of power system operation [1], [11], [12].
In [11] the authors concluded that the current practice of bad
data detection (BDD) to ensure data validity is insufficient as
knowledgeable attackers can inject data which evades BDDs.
Additional cyber-attacks, such as replay attacks and denial of
service (DoS) attacks, that can affect the visibility of the power
system are described in [13].
The DoS attacks are not the only challenge that can cause
congestion of communication channels [14]. As more and
more electronic devices have communication capabilities as
an inherent part of their design, a larger amount of data is
communicated and bottlenecks in the ICT network can occur.
By considering the power system as a dynamic physical
system, communication latency and interruptions can affect
the validity of the current power system operation shown
at the control center. Additional challenges are entailed by
the increase in the amount of data, which puts additional
performance requirements for control center computers to
process the data and give relevant and valid information of
current power system operation in a timely fashion [1].
B. Contingency Analysis
The contingency analysis in security assessment serves to
increase the security of supply by acknowledging possible
disturbances that can affect the power system dynamics. As
described in section II, the current practice is to investigate
possible power system equipment outages that have the largest
impact on the continuous operation [5], [6]. In the CPES, the
power system will have strong interactions with neighboring
energy systems such as the transportation, waste treatment and
domestic heating system [15].
These systems operate in ever changing environments which
complicate the contingency analysis by increasing the number
of possible disturbances with unknown severity. The uncer-
tainty lies in the operational environment of neighboring
energy systems, which indirectly affects the operation of the
power system. The operation of neighboring energy systems
are limited by a set of technical, environmental and govern-
mental constraints. Reaching these limits during operation can
disturb the CPES by limiting its controllability.
As more end-user services are electrified, the CPES has
more interactions with energy systems affected by end-user
irrational behavior. Even though power system engineers are
trying to implement control of end-user consumption, there is
no certainty that end-users will behave rational and always re-
member to plug-in EVs as an example. Additional uncertainty
is introduced as more intermittent DGs are installed. Thereby
the power system becomes more dependent on the weather
system, which increases the operational uncertainty further.
In the CPES, the power system and the ICT network are
interdependent, meaning a loss of power supply at a substation
or load bus affects the ICT equipment and when the ICT
network fails control, computation and monitoring actions be-
comes disabled. This cascading behavior has previously been
the cause of a major blackout which happened in Italy in 2003
[16]. From this interdependence the complexity of determining
possible contingencies increases further. Not only physical
power system equipment failure can cause disturbances, but
also failure of ICT network equipment.
The increasing interactions between ICT and the power
system was visualized in December 2015 when hackers gained
access of a part of the Ukrainian power system control center
and caused a region wide blackout [18]. Such an extreme
interference raise new questions to the security of the future
power system as a CPES [4], [10], [19] and adds an additional
contingency to the contingency analysis pool in the form of
outages of region wide SCADA networks.
Additional risk is present in the power system control
equipment, as a large number of the distributed units, have
autonomous control abilities. If hackers gain access to them,
they can change the control of these equipment to perform
harmful instead of helpful actions [9], [17]. These contingen-
cies apply a whole new level of risk and complexity in the
security assessment not considered in the current formulation
of the method.
From this short discussion of contingencies introduced by
the transition towards a CPES, the sheer number and variety
of possible contingencies is evident. The current contingency
analysis is based on the N-1 criterion, but with the increasing
number of interactions between systems in the CPES, predict-
ing the possible contingencies and their impact becomes even
more complicated than previously.
C. Preventive Control Actions
As the power system have previously been a centralized
physical system based on large generating units, the protective
actions have been performed by performing a constrained eco-
nomic dispatch where contingency impacts are considered [5],
[6]. However, due to the decentralization, a growing interest
in the research community has focused on the paradigm shift
where regulating actions are shifted from the generation side
to the consumption side.
This paradigm shift has resulted in numerous possible
control actions performed by distributed equipment that help
improve the operational status of the power system in a
continuous fashion. Examples of these include static VAR
compensators, inverters with droop control and active power
storage devices. However, as previously described, these de-
vices are vulnerable to unauthorized access where either the
control methods can be altered or false data can cause internal
control loops to perform undesirable control actions. Besides
the risk of cyber-attacks, the autonomous control capabilities
can also misbehave due to non-considered events as has
been seen on November 4, 2006, where a major European
blackout occurred. When the frequency increased beyond the
safe operation range of the wind farms in the Northeastern part
of Germany, they disconnected. When the operators managed
to improve the operational status of the power system and
lowered the frequency, the wind farms reconnected and forced
a recurring increase of system frequency [20].
In the consumption side of the power system, new methods
for controlling consumption have emerged. Most popular is the
demand response (DR) method, where household appliances
and electrified services can be controlled to change consump-
tion to balance the power system [21]. However, compared to
the traditional economic dispatch, where a relative few number
of units have to be coordinated, the DR method includes
controlling thousands, if not millions, of distributed units.
Therefore, the complexity of performing protection actions of
power systems increases rapidly [1], [15].
Furthermore, when all these distributed units are capable
of providing control which should help ensuring the security
of supply, further cyber security risk can be considered as
unauthorized personal can enforce protective control actions
when not required. An example is in the case of smart meters,
which are predicted to be distributed to all households in most
countries to enable real time pricing. These smart meters are
equipped with a control capability which allows the utility
company to disconnect the households from the grid, this
method is known as load shedding. If hackers gained access
to such a control mechanism, the protective nature of load
shedding could be turned into a disruptive action instead [22].
IV. CPES SECURITY ASSESSMENT
From the discussion of challenges and limitations of the
current security assessment method in section III it is apparent
that a revisit of the traditional method is needed when con-
sidering the transition towards a CPES shown in Fig. 2. An
updated security assessment method for CPES should consider
both interactions between the power system and neighboring
energy systems as well as the ICT network and the risk of
cyber-attacks.
A summary of all challenges described in section III are
divided into each phase of the security assessment shown in
Fig. 1 and are shown in Table I. In this section a description of
different technologies and methods that could help transform
the security assessment method and make it useful in the
future CPES. In this way, the aim of the current security
assessment will stay the same, but the means of achieving this
aim will change. Following the Ukraine blackout in December,
TABLE I
CHALLENGES FOR POWER SYSTEM SECURITY ASSESSMENT
Phase Challenge Solutions
Cyber-attacks IDS
Monitoring Communication congestion DI
Large data quantity Big data
Neighboring system constraints RMP
Neighboring system uncertainty RMP
Contingency Interdependence IA
analysis Unauthorized control IDS
SCADA outage RMP
Determining worst case DC
Recurring autonomous control Coordination
Preventive Cyber-attacks IDS
control actions Large-scale economic dispatch DO
2015, cybersecurity of power systems has been a hot topic for
both ICT and power system researchers [18]. The research
focus is further emphasized after the North American Electric
Reliability Corp. (NERC) has announced an update of their
grid codes from July 2016. The updated grid codes demand
that power system operators change the current methodology
of creating a cyber-perimeter to avoid unauthorized access, to
actively perform intrusion detection and prevention [23].
Already at the time of writing, there exists numerous
different intrusion detection systems (IDS), some of which are
explained in [9]. By implementing IDS into the CPES security
assessment method as additional cyber security measures, the
general CPS security increases as the monitoring and com-
munication network is less vulnerable to unauthorized access.
As seen in Table I, the implementation of IDS could help
counteract challenges in all phases of the security assessment
method.
In [1] the possibility of distributing calculations and deci-
sions making in the ICT network is introduced. The authors
propose utilization of the increased computational capacity of
integrated electronic devices (IEDs) to decentralize parts of
the control and computation responsibilities. By implementing
distributed intelligence (DI) into parts of the CPES, additional
challenges in Table I can be solved. In the monitoring phase,
DI can help analyze and filter data to limit the communication
channel congestion.
In the preventive control phase of security assessment,
distributed optimization (DO) can help by locally calculate
the required control actions that help balance the power system
in its current operation and against disturbances. By utilizing
DO, the number of units in the large-scale economic dispatch
decreases which increases the computational speed. Further-
more, in the contingency analysis phase, the determination
of worst case scenarios could be partially solved as the
combined computational power would increase when utilizing
distributed computation (DC). This means that a larger number
of contingency situations can be investigated.
In recent years researchers have looked into the Internet of
Things (IoT) and the concept of big data [24]. The utilization
of these technologies is widespread and could potentially be
applicable to the power system. As more and more data is
generated and available, a number of big data computational
tools have been developed which can help scientists in pro-
cessing large scale data. In the monitoring phase of security
assessment, a challenge is the large amount of available data
and how to process it safely without losing important signals
or alarms. Therefore the authors propose an investigation of
big data computational tools, such as machine learning and
clustering, applied to SCADA and PMU data [24]. The aim
is to improve the visibility and ease the preventive action
decision process.
The power system is not the only large scale system that is
facing problems and threats through strong interconnections
with ICT. For several years, industrial control systems have
recognized the risk of unauthorized personnel access due
to the growing digitalization of monitoring and actuating
devices. The common practice of industrial cyber security
starts by consultants performing a risk assessment (RA) of
the current control system. From this point security measures
such as encryption and certification of programmable logical
controllers (PLCs) are implemented [25].
In industrial control systems, the scale is somewhat small
compared to the power system. In the CPES, new devices are
implemented continuously and their sheer number is too large
for encrypting the whole network. Therefore RA in the power
system should be implemented as a continuous process as part
of a risk management process (RMP) [25].
The RMP contains different steps where the context of
the system is analyzed to provide an overview of intended
operation. After a context establishment, RA is performed
which consists of a risk identification, risk analysis and risk
evaluation process. These processes give an overview of the
current security threats and their impact. If such a RMP could
be done in a continuous fashion for the cyber risk in the CPES,
the SCADA outage challenge in the contingency analysis in
Table I could be treated.
A RMP can also be developed to analyze the threats posed
by neighboring energy systems and their changing environ-
ment. For example an identification of possible changes in the
neighboring energy system environments could be performed
utilizing system specific techniques such as weather forecasts,
seasonal or daily variations in transport requirements etc.. The
impact of these risk can then be analyzed and evaluated in a
similar fashion as cyber risk, which could be useful for treating
the neighboring energy system constraints and uncertainty
challenges of the contingency analysis parts of Table I.
The topic of interdependency have previously been covered
by [16] and [12]. In the latter, the effects of having backup
power supply to control centers in the ICT network is in-
vestigated. The process of a interdependency analysis (IA) in
the CPES can be applied in the CPES security assessment
method and give indications of large scale contingencies and
their combined impact in the power system and the ICT
network. The integration of such an analytical tool could solve
the interdependence challenge in the contingency analysis in
Table I.
In case of a fault in the power system or unsustainable oper-
ating conditions, autonomous control units can help providing
fast regulating actions. However, as mentioned earlier they
can also worsen the problem due to build-in control action
constraints. In order to ensure fast recovery from a fault, it
would make sense to analyze the behavior of autonomous
control units in normal and abnormal operating conditions
and coordinate the control of these units in case of abnormal
operating conditions, the implementation of fault coordination
is shown in Table I for the recurring autonomous control
challenge in the preventive control action phase.
A. Proposed framework
The discussion on problems faced by the current security
assessment method in Section III. and the possible theoret-
ical solutions presented in Section IV. is used as the base
of a framework for CPES security assessment presented in
the following. The general idea of the new security assess-
ment framework is to distribute the process of monitoring,
contingency analysis and preventive actions decision to the
distribution level.
In the CPES, the distribution network is diverse and ranges
from substations connected to distributed generation such
as wind farms, to substations connecting residential areas
with both generation and consumption. The CPES security
assessment method is based on an implementation of IEDs
at a substation level. At this level, the IEDs will perform the
tasks presented in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3 the monitoring task is
preceded by an intrusion detection task, the type of IDS at each
substation can vary according to the operational environment.
After the signals measured in each substation area is validated
by the IDS, the IED observes whether the measured values















Fig. 3. Proposed framework of security assessment of future cyber-physical
energy system.
on a substation level, less data is being transferred to the
main control centers and the risk of communication channel
congestion is lower.
As in the original security assessment method, the IEDs
will assess the security of the system by including faults and
disturbances, that can happen in each distinctive area, in the
contingency analysis task of Fig. 3. Prior to the contingency
analysis, the IEDs will utilize knowledge about their respective
area to predict the worst case scenarios based on the risks and
uncertainties in their part of the CPES, including interactions
between physical and cyber systems.
In the case where a preventive actions is needed, the
IEDs will evaluate the distributed control of their area and
coordinate and perform the optimal control. If the system is
unable to perform a suitable preventive action, the required
information about needed control are send to the transmission
level control center, which will act as an additional layer of
security,
The transmission system control center will perform a secu-
rity assessment of similar to the one shown in Fig. 3 and will
handle the overall operation of the system by including central
power plant operation points and interdependence analysis in
the contingency analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the power system security assessment is
analyzed in a CPES with strong interconnections between the
power system, ICT network and neighboring energy systems.
From the analysis of CPS safety, security and sustainability in
the future CPES, a number of challenges are listed for each of
the three phases in the traditional security assessment method.
Based on the challenges, a new framework for CPES security
assessment is proposed, which adds new solutions, such as
IDS and RMP, on top of the traditional power system security
assessment method.
Topics of further research include investigation of IDSs, dis-
tributed optimization, intelligence and computation, analysis
of utilizing big data computational tools to improve visibility
and development of a RMP that can cover all risks in a CPES.
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